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Abstract. Firms that wish to offer wireline, multichannel video
programming services in direct competition with cable incumbents
are being faced with calls by those incumbents and policymakers to
"build-out" to entire communities as a pre-condition to receiving a
franchise. This "build-out" requirement is often incorporated into
the local cable franchising process. In this paper, we show that build-
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out mandates are actually counter-productive and serve primarily to
deter new entry, increase the profits of incumbents, and harm
consumers. Using both a theoretical model and an empirical
simulation, we show that build-out rules cause new video entrants to
bypass certain communities entirely and sharply lower the number of
communities in which new network construction would be profitable.
We show that consumer welfare is likely to be higher with "free
entry" policies that impose no build-out requirement.
I. Introduction
In order to provide multichannel delivered video programming, a
new entrant must first obtain a franchise from the local and county
governments in every market it wishes to serve. Very often, the
franchise contract requires that the new entrant agree to geographic
build-out requirements as a pre-condition to receiving a franchise,
and this process results in a form of creeping governmental control.1
While these build-out requirements may have altruistic intentions
behind them (e.g., preventing a "digital divide, 2 or promoting local
economic development), ex ante build-out requirements are, on
average, counterproductive and serve to slow down deployment of
communications networks.3 As a result, these build-out mandates
actually reduce consumer welfare and increase the profits of
incumbent providers in many communities. Build-out requirements
1. See Frank Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv.
4,39 (1984) (emphasis supplied).
Often an agency with the power to deny an application... or to delay the grant of the
application will grant approval only if the regulated firm agrees to conditions ....
The firm will accept the conditions only when they make both it and the agency
(representing the public or some other constituency) better off. Still, though, the
agency's options often are potent, and the grant of an application on condition may
greatly increase the span of the agency's control
2. D. McCullagh, Bells' Fiber Plans Spark Political Flame War, CNET News (April
20, 2005) (quoting Ranking House Energy and Commerce Committee Member Ed
Markey as complaining that "When a cable company wires a community, it must offer
service to all households, so why should [new MVPD entrants] be permitted to select
which neighborhoods are wired with fiber first?"). However, numerous studies reveal
there is little correlation between income and cable penetration. For a review of this
literature, see , Kieschnick and B. D. McCullough, Why Do People Not Subscribe to
Cable Television? A Review of the Evidence, Unpublished Manuscript (1998) at 7-8 and
Appendix A, available at http://www.tprc.org/abstracts98/lkieschnick.pdf.
3. Significantly, the FCC has explicitly preempted state laws that require new
telephone entrants from any "build-out" requirements. See In the Matter of the Public
Utility Commission of Texas, CC Policy Docket Nos, 96-13, 96-14, 96-16 and 96-19,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC No. 97-346 (rel. Oct. 1, 1997) (hereinafter "Texas
Build-Out Preemption Order").
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are, therefore, a self-defeating exercise.4  For this reason, it should
come as no surprise that the FCC found over ten years ago that the
"local franchise process is, perhaps, the most important policy-
relevant barrier to competitive entry in local cable markets."5
While it may seem to be a counter-intuitive conclusion, it is
important that policymakers understand the consequences that a
build-out requirement will have on the ability of a firm to enter the
market. This paper first presents in Section II a simple conceptual
framework to evaluate build-out requirements in video markets. As
we show, for a policymaker, a build-out requirement is a risky
gamble, because while ubiquitous 100% overlap entry (or something
close to it) is possible on one hand (clearly a good result for
consumers), there still exists the very real possibility that a new
entrant will stay out of the market and bypass the community
altogether (thus leaving consumers with the status quo). Moreover,
our theoretical framework shows that incumbents and consumers
cannot both benefit from a build-out rule, which leaves open the
question of why both incumbents and policymakers advocate such
rules.
To generate plausible estimates of the likely effects of build-out
requirements on consumers and firms, Section III sets forth a
computer-based simulation based on the conceptual framework
outlined in Section II. This simulation answers the important
empirical questions asked by the conceptual model. Our simulation
reveals, under plausible circumstances, that a build-out rule results in
a different form of "economic redlining"-i.e., the build-out rule has
less effect on the incentives of a firm to serve the most-profitable
communities, but a large effect on deployment in more marginal
communities. As such, the simulation leads to the inexorable
conclusion that build-out requirements are, on average, more likely to
4. While consumers do have satellite as a possible substitute to the incumbent cable
operator, the U.S. General Accounting Office found that the price cuts for video services
from wireline competition are approximately three times larger than those from satellite
competition. See Direct Broadcast Satellite Subscribership Has Grown Rapidly, but Varies
across Different Types of Markets, Report to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition
Policy and Consumer Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, US Government
Accountability Office, GAO-05-257 (2005). As such, consumers clearly benefit
significantly from terrestrial MVPD overbuild entry.
5. In re Implementation of Section 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the
Market for Delivery of Video Programming, 9 FCC Rcd 7442, Appendix H at 375 (1994)
(hereinafter "Appendix H") (emphasis supplied); see also Richard Posner, The
Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. OF ECON. 98-
129 (1972).
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benefit incumbent firms than to increase the welfare of consumers,
since such rules deter entry. In short, build-out rules conflict with the
stated goals of federal, state, and local governments regarding the
desire to see the construction of advanced communications networks
as quickly as possible.6
I. An Economic Analysis of Build-out Requirements
To study the impact a "build-out" rule has on the deployment
decisions of a new entrant seeking to deploy advanced fiber networks,
we first outline a simple, stylized economic model of sequential entry.
This theoretical approach originates in the standard economics of
entry, and it shows that build-out requirements are unambiguously
bad for entrants and will make entry more costly and therefore less
6. FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin has called "the deployment of new packetized
networks throughout the nation" to be "one of the Commission's core priorities."
Statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin, In the Matter of Petition of SBC Communications
Inc. for Forbearance from the Application of Title H Common Carrier Regulation to IP
Platform Services, WC Docket No. 04-29 (May 5, 2005). Section 706 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 11157 nt. directs the Commission
to encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans. President George W. Bush has established a 2007 goal of "universal,
affordable access to broadband technology." See generally, Availability of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability in the United States, GN Docket No. 04-54, Fourth Report
to Congress, 19 FCC Rcd 20540, 20578 (2004). The White House, A New Generation of
American Innovation (April 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/technology/economic-policy20404/innovation.pdf at
11. On June 24, 2004, President Bush said: "What we're interested in is to make sure
broadband technology is available in every comer of America by 2007." THE WHITE
HOUSE, President Bush: High Tech Improving Economy, Health Care, Education, (June
24, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2004/06/20040624-7.htrnl.
According to a 2002 Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, the average household
spends $51 per month on multichannel video programming services, which represents a
significant portion of their total communications (voice, video, Internet, wireless)
spending (which averages about $122 per month per household). J. B. Horrigan,
Consumption of Information Goods and Services in the United States, Pew Internet &
American Life Project (2003), available at
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPInfoConsumption.pdf at 28. If a new entrant
cannot readily provide consumers multichannel video over an advanced network, then the
prospects for success will be diminished substantially due to a reduction in the entrant's
potential revenues. Quite simply, the ability to sell video services over these fiber
networks may be a crucial factor in getting those fiber networks deployed.
Regulators are not always sensitive to the importance video availability has on
deployment. For example, the New York Public Service Commission issued an order
recently that failed to resolve the question as to whether Verizon could sell video services
over its new, all-fiber FiOS network, stating that it would resolve that question only after
Verizon had constructed the fiber network and stood ready to sell video service.
Declaratory Ruling on Verizon Communications, Inc.'s Build-Out of its Fiber to the
Premises Network, Joint Petition of the Town of Babylon, et al., Case Nos. 05-M-0250 and
05-M-0247 (rel. June 15, 2005).
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likely.7 However, theory alone cannot determine what effects a build-
out requirement will have on consumers and incumbents, but the
theory does provide guidance on what factors and relationships are
important.
A. The Entry Model
Generally, a firm's decision to enter a market is a function of the
potential profits from serving the market and the costs of entering the
market. Quite simply, entry will be more widespread if profits are
higher and the costs of entering are lower. Based on this simple logic,
we can evaluate the influence of build-out requirements on entry.
Say there is a market of H homes served by an incumbent
monopolist.8 The incumbent's network passes all H homes, but not
all homes subscribe to the service. The monopolist earns profit m.
Costs to construct the incumbent's network are sunk, and thus do not
affect the marginal decisions of the incumbent. For simplicity,
assume the marginal cost of a subscriber is zero and a uniform price is
charged across the entire market (i.e., there is no price discrimination
in the market).9
Now, let there be a firm contemplating entry into this market.
The entrant knows that the market price declines as the overlap of
the entrant's and incumbent's networks rises, and it knows the cost of
serving each of the homes.0 This price will be uniform across the
7. George Ford, Thomas Koutsky & Lawrence Spiwak, Competition after
Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure and Convergence, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY
PAPER No. 21 (July 2005) (providing a recent and highly consumable analysis of the
determinants of entry).
8. The monopoly assumption is for convenience. There could be more than one
incumbent, or an incumbent facing limited competition from a highly differentiated
product.
9. The assumption of zero marginal cost is for convenience. This assumption is
equivalent to one where we describe "prices" or "revenues" as being net of variable costs.
With zero marginal cost for the incumbent and positive entry cost for the entrant, our
simulated markets are natural monopolies (it is always cheaper for the incumbent to
provide the service than the entrant). Thus, we do not make total welfare calculations,
since total welfare under such circumstances will be lower with entry. Even with these
assumptions, the calculation of profits and consumer welfare are legitimate. Eliminating
the natural monopoly problem provides nearly no benefit, yet would make the simulation
much more complicated.
10. T. R. Beard, G. S. Ford, R. C. Hill, & R. P. Saba, Fragmented Duopoly: A
Conceptual and Empirical Investigation, J. OF Bus. (Forthcoming 2005) (download draft at
www.aestudies.com) ("Beard, Ford, Hill and Saba"); K. Basu and C. Bell, Fragmented
Duopoly: Theory and Applications to Backward Agriculture, 36 J. OF DEV. ECON. 145-165
(1991); A. K. Smiley, Direct Competition among Cable Television Systems, U.S.
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, EAG paper #86-9 (June 5, 1986).
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entire market, even if the entrant only serves a part of the market,
although the degree of that price competition will, of course, be
related to how much overlap there is between the two networks.1
Post-entry profit (the duopoly profit) of the entrant is d(h), where the
entrant passes h of the H homes. Entry requires the entrant to pay
entry costs e, where entry costs rise with the number of homes passed.
We assume the entrant will enter only if net profits are non-negative:
d(h) - e(h) > 0. As the number of homes passed rises, profits fall and
entry costs rise, and eventually the cost of adding another home
reduces net profits [d(h*) - e(h*) > d(h* + 1) - e(h* + 1)]. At this
point, the entrant stops expanding its network and serves h* homes,
where h* is the number of homes passed that maximizes the entrant's
net profits.
B. Free Entry versus Build-Out Requirements
In the absence of a build-out rule (free entry), the entrant will
choose to serve h* homes and will therefore earn gross profits of
d(h*). Consumer surplus rises and incumbent profits fall with entry
(since price falls for all subscribers and the entrant acquires market
share). Let us assume that in the absence of a build-out rule, the
entrant will only serve part of the market (h* < H).2
Because of the build-out rule, the entrant must construct a larger
network to serve all H homes, instead of the h* homes it otherwise
would have chosen. Making the entrant build a larger network will
reduce its gross profits and raise entry costs. 13 The result is that net
will profits unambiguously decline in the presence of this mandate,
(that is, d(H) - e(H)< d(h*) - e(h*)), since the addition of homes
above h* adds more to costs than to gross profits. Thus, at the
margin, build-out rules reduce the prospects for entry. The extent of
this deterrence will depend on aggregate profits. Thus, the firm
enters only if d(H) - e(H) > 0, which is not guaranteed (even though
we assume it is profitable for the monopolist to have done so).
11. See Beard, Ford, Hill & Saba, supra note 10.
12. This assumption keeps the analysis interesting. If h* = H, then the build-out
constraint is non-binding (has no effect). However, even if the entrant desires to the serve
the entire market today, the build-out rule is undesirable, since it always forecloses the
opportunity to serve less than the entire market.
13. First, if the entrant prefers partial entry (h* </-), then the build-out requirement
reduces gross profits (by definition). Second, build-out requirements increase entry costs
since they require the entrant to build to more homes than the entrant would willingly
choose [e(h*)< e(H)]. Thus, the build-out rule reduces the prospects for entry by
attacking the entrant from all sides, cutting gross profits and raising entry costs.
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An entrant faced with a legally-mandated build-out requirement
thus faces a tradeoff-i.e., it is forced to decide whether to enter an
entire community by balancing the profits earned serving the h*
homes versus the losses incurred from serving the remainder of the
market (homes h* to H). This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The Entry Decision under a Build-Out Rule
households ordered by entry cost
t ...................................................................................... Wr h
0h* H
h, Overlap
In the figure, the vertical axis is price and the horizontal axis is
the number of homes the entrant will choose to pass with its new
network. In this table, we rank homes by entry costs (e) (that is, the
cost of constructing to a home increases along the horizontal axis).
Since the costs of homes are ranked and the demand for the service is
randomly distributed, the horizontal axis also measures the degree of
system overlap. There are two curves in the figure, average profit per
homes passed r(h) and entry costs e(h).14 Without a build-out rule,
the entrant will service h* homes (the intersection of the two curves).
Serving h* homes-the number of homes it would serve without a
build-out requirement-the entrant will have a net profit equal to the
area bounded by points TWV, which is clearly positive. 5 Under a
build-out rule, the entrant's net profit is the difference Uxv - xYz,
which in this case is plainly negative. 6 The area uXv is positive net
profit (r > e) and the area XYz is the negative net profits (r < e).
Since uxv > xyz, the entrant would not enter under a build-out rule.
14. Note that r(h).h = d(h).
15. Net profits are calculated as: TWh*0 - vwh*0.
16. Net profits are calculated as: uZHO - vYH0.
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Note that whether or not a build-out rule deters entry depends on the
shapes of the r and e curves."
C. Summary of Build-Out Effects
At this point, the consequences of the build-out rule are readily
assessed. Without the build-out rule, there may be partial entry.
With partial entry, the entrant will make a positive profit, the
incumbent's profits will be reduced due to competition, and
consumers will benefit from lower prices and higher output. The
partial entry case is unambiguously better for consumers and
unambiguously worse for incumbents.
18
But with a build-out rule, entry may still happen, or it may not
occur at all. If entry occurs, then consumers will reap the full benefit
of the price reduction available from 100% overlap of the networks.
The price reduction with complete overlap will be larger than the
price reduction consumers would see if the entrant had passed only
50% of the market. Price reductions are good for consumers, but
while full entry will provide the greatest benefit to consumers,
consumers will benefit only if entry occurs. Indeed, there is a very
real risk that the entrant may choose to stay out of the market
altogether under a build-out rule. If the entrant stays out, then the
entrant obviously gets no profit, the incumbent's profits are
unchanged, and consumer surplus remains at the monopoly level A
build-out rule that deters entry provides the least benefit to
consumers (none), but the most benefit to the incumbent (retention
of monopoly profits). 9
For a policymaker, a build-out requirement is a risky gamble.
The policymaker may be fortunate to be in a community in which
certain neighborhoods are so profitable that a new, prospective
entrant will build even if a build-out requirement is imposed. In that
situation, our model shows that an incumbent cable operator facing a
complete "over-build" in its community will face a significant
reduction in profits. But what if the policymaker is wrong in this
17. We can easily concoct examples where the build-out rule does not deter entry,
which is why theory alone cannot resolve this issue.
18. We have assumed a uniform price, so all customers in the market will benefit
from partial entry, no matter how partial it is.
19. For this reason, the FCC determined that competitive local telephone build-out
requirements constituted an unlawful barrier to entry. Texas Build-Out Preemption
Order, supra note 3, at 1 13 ("build-out requirements are of central importance to
competitive entry because these requirements impact the threshold question of whether a
potential competitor will enter the local exchange market at all").
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assumption? In that situation, the prospective entrant will bypass the
entire community if a build-out requirement is imposed. In that latter
situation, the only entity that benefits is the incumbent cable
operator. Simply given the shape of the debate on this topic, in which
incumbent cable operators are steadfast proponents of build-out
requirements for new entrants, we are inclined to believe that the
latter scenario-entry deterrence-is the far more likely in most
communities. 2° As a result, build-out rules, while well-intentioned
when proposed by city officials and consumers, may in the end do
more harm than good.
An alternative summary of the effects of the build-out
requirements on the participants is provided by a matrix of
preference outcomes. In Table 1, preferences are rated 1, 2, and 3,
with 1 being the most and 3 the least preferred outcome. We rank the
preferences of consumers, incumbents, and entrants.
TABLE 1. PREFERRED OUTCOMES
(1 is most, 3 is least preferred)
Build-Out Rule
Participant Free Entry Entry No Entry
Consumer 2 1 3
Incumbent 2 3 1
Consumers of course would prefer a build-out rule, but only if
entry still occurs. If entry is not assured, then consumers would then
clearly prefer free entry to a build-out rule that would deter entry
entirely. The worst-case scenario for the consumer is a build-out rule
that deters entry. In contrast, the incumbent most prefers a build-out
rule with deterred entry, but prefers partial entry to a build-out rule
with entry. Free entry is more desirable than a build-out rule with
entry, but less desirable than a build-out rule that effectively deters
entry.
The conflict between the desires of the cable incumbents and
the consumers is again as apparent as it is interesting. Many
policymakers and incumbent cable operators advocate build-out
rules, but the effect of the rule is to harm one party and help the
20. Cable operators, alternately, are profit maximizers and should be expected to
support only those regulations that increase their profits. Since higher profits for firms
means lower consumer surplus (absent quality increases), the build-out rule from the view
of the cable firms cannot be welfare improving. Thus, from the perspective of the
incumbent cable operators, build-out rules are advocated as a means with which to protect
profits from competition.
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other, depending on whether entry occurs. Both groups are taking a
gamble with this position-policymakers are gambling that entry will
occur even with a build-out rule, but the incumbents are gambling
that entry will not occur with a build-out rule.
HI. Simulation of Entry under a Build-Out Rule
Our entry model reveals that the key question for a
policymaker is straight forward: is the entry-deterring effect of a
build-out mandate sufficient to deter entry altogether? The
simulation described in this Section provides evidence on the entry
deterring effects of build-out rules. Thankfully, the simulation is not
the only evidence regarding the entry-deterring effects of build-out
rules. Hazlett and Ford (2001) show, using economic theory and a
statistical test, that build-out rules significantly reduce entry in cable
television markets.2' Thus, the ability of such rules to deter entry has
been plainly demonstrated.
This simulation of sequential entry is based on the entry game
from the previous section. We stress to the reader that this is only a
simulation, and we adopt a number of simplifying assumptions to ease
the implementation and evaluation of the simulation. All the markets
evaluated are hypothetical, as are the costs and demand relationships.
We do our best, however, to avoid any assumption that will render
(or tend to render) misleading inferences, and we try to calibrate the
model to known values and relationships in the cable and
telecommunications industries. The purpose of the simulation is
merely to provide an informed guess of the effects of build-out
requirements, and to illustrate clearly the tradeoff between
incumbents and consumers. We focus our attention here on the main
findings of the simulation, and refer the reader to the Appendix for
the details on the simulation.
We are not the first to construct a simulation to evaluate entry
and build-out requirements in local communications markets.
Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) construct a simulation similar to
ours, though their approach is more technical. While the focus of that
study is on the prospects for a multi-firm equilibrium, the authors did
simulate the effect of build-out requirements. They conclude,
"imposition of a universal service mandate actually creates an
21. T. W. Hazlett and G. S. Ford, The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic
Analysis of the Level Playing Field in Cable TV Franchising Statutes, 3 BUSINESS &
POLITICS 21-46 (2001); see also Appendix H, supra note 5.
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artificial (as opposed to a natural) monopoly."22  Our findings are
generally consistent with this earlier research.
A. Simulation Summary
In the simulation, we have 100 markets with 1000 homes each.
23
The incumbent has constructed network to pass all 1000 homes in all
markets. We assume that 50% of households subscribe to the
monopolist's service (a 50% penetration rate) 6 Each home has its
own unique capital costs; we calibrate the simulation for an average
capital cost of $600, which is consistent with capital costs for a
traditional cable network per home passed.2 These capital costs vary
by home, and entry costs are lognormally distributed (similar to the
shape in Figure 1).6 Marginal costs are assumed to be zero for both
the entrant and incumbent. The incumbent has already built its
network and the costs are sunk.
Now we assume that a prospective entrant is deciding whether
to enter this community. In the absence of a build-out requirement,
the entrant will build a network to a home as long as its net profits
will increase with that construction. We assume that the entrant will
take a market share of 35% of the homes it passes that subscribe to
the service, which is substantially above the analysts' estimates of
entrant penetration in video markets. 7 (In additional simulations, we
22. G. R. Faulhaber and C. Hogendom, The Market Structure of Broadband
Communications, 48(3) J. INDUS. ECON. 305,323 (2000).
23. The simulation is flexible enough to evaluate different values for both the number
of markets and the homes in each. All markets, however, must be of the same size.
Changing the number of markets or their size does not affect the results in any meaningful
way.
24. The simulation is calibrated so that the incumbent will serve the entire market
under a build-out rule, even if the incumbent prefers not to build out (which is typically
the case). The 50% penetration is consistent with a major cable provider's current
penetration, but the assumption is primary one of convenience. See Comcast Corporation,
2004 Form 10-K at 3 (Feb. 23, 2005) (noting 52.8% penetration in 2004).
25. T. W. Hazlett and G. Bittlingmayer, The Political Economy of Cable "Open
Access" 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 (2003); M. Shapiro and D. Gall, The New Economics
of Overbuilds, BROADBAND NETWORKS (2000). We recognize that these costs may be
lower than current technology, but higher costs only make the deterrent effect stronger, so
our assumption is conservative.
26. In effect, our cost function is driven by population density, which is known to be
approximately lognormal. J. B. Parr and G. J. O'Neill, Aspects of the Lognormal Function
in the Analysis of Regional Population Distribution, 21 ENV'T AND PLAN. at 961-73 (1989).
The Appendix contains a detailed description of the cost function.
27. Banc of America Securities, Bell Video-IPTV is Not Yet the Answer, Research
Brief (June 2, 2005) (hereinafter "BOA Bell Video Research Brief") at 1 ("History has
shown on numerous occasions, with limited exceptions, that new entrant linear TV
competitors usually reach only 15% market share after 10 years.").
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contemplate both lower and higher penetrations rates. If the
aggregate market penetration is 60%, the entrant serves 21% of
homes if it passes all homes.) As economic theory reveals, the degree
of price competition and network overlap impacts profits. As the
overlap of rival networks rises, the market price will decline. Our
benchmark assumption is that the full overlap price is 20% lower than
the monopoly price. We also assume that as the level of overlap
between incumbent and entrant decreases, this price decline also will
decrease in a linear fashion. It should be noted that in situations
where an incumbent cable firm only sees a partial geographic entry in
a market, prices are reduced throughout the market, even in areas
where the entrant has not built a network. This price reduction is
consistent with research of pricing behavior in the few markets that
have seen cable overbuilding. 2  Alternate assumptions on the
expected price decrease are also considered. As prices fall due to
competition, market penetration will rise.29
With zero marginal cost, we can interpret "price" to mean the
stream of gross profits from the customer (and not the monthly
price). In effect, "price" is the (present value) sum of the monthly
payments of the subscriber over the life of the network)0 Consumer
reservation prices (required for consumer surplus calculations) are set
so that at the monopoly price, the penetration rate is 50%. Prices are
calibrated so the value of the incumbent's cable system is $1200 per
home passed (consistent with cable industry statistics)."
Household demand for cable service is a function of price
alone. Thus, all variation in penetration across markets is cost-based,
not demand driven. Therefore, we assume that the entrant will not
exclude markets based on household demographics (e.g., income,
race, etc.).
B. Results of the Simulation
Table 2 summarizes the results of the benchmark simulation.
Prior to entry, the monopolist passes all homes (100.1000 = 100,000)
28. See Beard, Ford, Hill & Saba, supra note 10.
29. The demand curve is linear, with an elasticity of -1 at the monopoly price. The
change in penetration for a price reduction is measured using the slope of the demand
curve. Aggregate penetration at the 20% price reduction is 60%.
30. The assumption is $2400 per subscriber at the monopoly price. The assumption
of zero marginal cost is equivalent to an assumption of net price, where net price is the
actual price minus variable cost.
31. In the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for
the Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 04-227, Eleventh Annual Report
(Feb. 4,2005) at Table 5 (hereinafter "Eleventh Annual Cable Competition Report").
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and serves all markets.32 Consumer surplus is $60 million and the
incumbent's profits are $120 million. 3
In the free entry equilibrium (i.e., no build-out rule), the
entrant will partially enter all 100 markets and pass approximately
60% of all homes at a cost of $18 million. Consumer surplus rises to
$75 million and the incumbent's profits fall to $94 million.
Unsurprisingly, entry is good for consumers (+$26M) and bad for the
incumbent (-$15M).
TABLE 2. RESULTS OF BENCHMARK SIMULATION
Entrant's Markets Entrant's Consumer Incumbent's
Homes Passed Entered Investment Surplus Profits
Monopoly ... ... ... $60M $120M
Free Entry 60,000 100 $18M $75M $94M
Build-Out Rule 15,000 15 $6M $64M $113M
Notes: Reported results are based on an average of 10 runs of the simulation. Results are
rounded.
With a build-out rule, however, entry is substantially curtailed.
The entrant no longer enters all markets and instead now chooses to
serve only 15 of the 100 markets, with total homes passed of only
15,000. Thus, 85 of the 100 markets are bypassed entirely by the new
entrant, and consumers in those markets see no benefit from
competition whatsoever. Consumer welfare is $64 million, down
from $75 million in the free entry case. 4 This decline in consumer
surplus indicates that consumers in the 85 markets "left behind" are
harmed by the build-out rule far more than consumers in the other 15
markets benefit from the build-out requirement. As expected, the
incumbent cable company's profits are higher in the presence of a
build-out rule than free entry ($113 million to $94 million).
From our benchmark simulation, we see that build-out rules
are bad for consumers and good for incumbents. Moreover, this
simulation shows that a build-out rule results in a different form of
"economic redlining"-i.e., the build-out rule has little effect on the
incentives of a firm to serve the most-profitable communities but
instead causes the complete bypass of more marginal communities.35
32. The simulation is calibrated to ensure that it is profitable for the monopolist to
wire the entire market under a build-out rule.
33. Consumer surplus is the difference between what consumers are willing to pay for
a service (i.e., reservation prices) and the market price.
34. The maximum consumer welfare is about $86M (at 100% overlap).
35. Red-lining is typically associated with the treatment of different income groups.
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In our simulation, the build-out rule caused the entrant to build a
network that passed only 25% of the homes than it would have built
in the absence of such a rule.
C. Sensitivity to Market Share Assumption
In Table 3, we evaluate the simulation results across a range of
market shares for the entrant (the benchmark being 35%). Table 3
shows that the entry-deterring effect of a build-out rule is strong even
with less-optimistic and more-optimistic market share assumptions.
At a 15% market share, the entrant enters all 100 markets and passes
10% of the homes with free entry, on average. If the entrant's market
share rises to 50%, then the entrant passes 79% of homes, on
average, in the 100 markets.
Likewise, with higher market shares, the entrant will pass more
homes under a build-out rule, though the entrant always passes fewer
homes under a build-out rule than under a policy of free entry. Even
if the entrant achieves a 50% market share, then the entrant will serve
only 65 of the 100 markets. Note that if the entrant only achieves a
market share of less than 35%, then the entrant will fail to enter any
market under a build-out rule. One recent analyst report predicts
that the telecommunications carriers' market share of video services
will be 15%, so the prospect that entry will not occur because of
build-out rules-even for large, well-financed firms like the Bells-is
genuine.36
But, as we illustrate here, partial entry can also be motivated by cost differences even if
households do not vary in demand characteristics.
36. See BOA Bell Video Research Brief, supra note 27.
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TABLE 3. EFFECTS OF THE ENTRANT'S MARKET SHARE
Entrant
Market
Share
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
Entrant's Share Entrant's Entrant's Consumer Incumbent's
Homes Passed Markets Investment Surplus Profits
to Total Homes Served $Mil $Mil $Mil
(100,000)
Free Build- Free Build- Free Build- Free Build- Free Build-
Entry Out Entry Out Entry Out Entry Out Entry Out
Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule
0.10 0.00 100 0 2 0 63 60 117 120
0.26 0.00 100 0 7 0 67 60 112 120
0.75 0.00 100 0 12 0 71 60 104 120
0.60 0.15 100 15 18 6 75 64 94 113
0.69 0.36 100 36 22 15 78 69 85 102
0.75 0.54 100 54 26 23 80 74 76 90
0.79 0.65 100 65 28 30 81 77 71 79
Notes: Reported results are based on an average of 10 runs of the simulation. Results are
rounded.
The entrant's investment is likewise positively related to its
market share. What is interesting about the statistics on investment is
the relationship between investment in the free entry and build-out
scenarios. If the entrant has only a small market share, then
investment is higher with free entry. As the entrant's share rises,
investment becomes higher in the build-out case. Note, however, that
in every case the number of homes passed falls with the build-out
rule. Thus, even though investment may be higher, even significantly
so, the increased investment does not lead to more service being
provided. At a 50% market share for the entrant, it costs more to
serve 18% fewer homes under a build-out rule. Clearly, build-out
rules lead to excessive and less productive investment, and are thus
socially undesirable.
The final two headings of Table 3 are the most important for
analyzing the "consumer welfare" versus the "incumbent profit"
justification for a build-out rule. Observe that consumer surplus
under the build-out rule is never larger, and typically much smaller,
than consumer surplus with free entry.37 Thus, we find no support
here for a consumer justification for build-out requirements.
Alternately, the incumbent's profits are always larger with a build-out
rule than with free entry. So, the best argument for a build-out rule
seems to be the profit motive-i.e., the role of build-out requirements
is to protect the profits of the incumbent.
37. It is theoretically possible to get higher consumer surplus with build-out rules, but
only under some rather extreme assumptions. Even then, the increase in surplus over the
free entry case would be rather small.
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D. Sensitivity to Price Competition Assumption
In the benchmark case, we assumed the price was 20% less
than the monopoly price if the rival networks completely overlapped
(with prices decreasing linearly between monopoly and 100%
overlap). In Table 4, we present the output of the simulation at price
cuts ranging from 0% to 50% off monopoly levels at 100% overlap.
For all the simulations summarized in Table 4, the entrant is assumed
to have a 35% post-entry market share (as in the benchmark case).
TABLE 4. EFFECTS OF THE INTENSITY OF PRICE COMPETITION
Assumed Entrant's Entrant Entrant's Consumer Incumbent's
Price Cut Homes Passed Markets Investment Surplus Profits
at 100% to Total Homes Sed $Mil $Mil $Mil
Overlap (100,000)
Free Build- Free Build- Free Build- Free Build- Free Build-
Entry Out Entry Out Entry Out Entry Out Entry Out
Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule
0.00 0.61 0.23 100 23 19 9 60 60 94 110
0.10 0.60 0.21 100 21 19 8 68 63 94 111
0.20 0.60 0.15 100 15 18 6 75 64 94 113
0.30 0.57 0.04 100 4 18 1 83 62 93 118
0.40 0.56 0.00 100 0 17 0 90 60 92 120
0.50 0.53 0.00 100 0 16 0 96 60 91 120
Notes: Reported results are based on an average of 10 runs of the simulation. Results are
rounded.
From the table we see that large price reductions due to
competition do not have a particularly strong effect on the free entry
equilibrium. The percent of homes passed in the free entry
equilibrium fall from 61% to 53% as the price cut rises from 0% to
50%, and the entrant's investment remains relatively stable at just
under $20 million. In contrast, the build-out rule is a much more
potent deterrent to entry as price competition intensifies. For
example, if the price cut rises from 20% to 30% (a plausible scenario
given published estimates of the price effects of cable competition),
then the entrant's homes passed fall from 15% to 4% of homes (15
markets to 4 markets).-8 The entrant does not enter at all under a
38. A Government Accountability Office study estimates a 16% price differential
based on the average overlap of cable rivals, where the average is less than 100%. See
GAO, Direct Broadcast Satellite Subscribership Has Grown Rapidly, but Varies across
Different Types of Markets, Report to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy
and Consumer Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, US. Senate, US Government
Accountability Office, GAO-05-257, 33 (April 2005) (hereinafter "GAO Report"); Beard,
Ford, Hill & Saba, supra note 10, at 8.
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build-out rule if the price cut is 40% or larger.
While consumer surplus rises with the intensity of price
competition in the free entry case, consumer surplus falls toward the
monopoly level under a build-out rule with intense price competition.
But observe that consumer surplus has a non-linear relationship with
the intensity of price competition. At both a 0% and 50% price cut
consumer surplus is $60 million (the monopoly level), and between
these two extremes consumer surplus is always larger than $60
million. The explanation is straightforward. If entry does not reduce
prices (0%), then consumers gain nothing from entry; but if the
combination of aggressive pricing and build-out rules deter entry
(+40%), then consumers gain nothing. Intermediate ranges of price
cuts allow for some entry, and consumers always benefit from price-
reducing entry. Because perfect collusion is practically impossible
and the evidence weighs against collusive outcomes, 9 this simulation
reveals that the only certain method of increasing consumer welfare
in video markets is to have entry without build-out rules.
The relationship of incumbent profits to price competition is
also interesting. With a free entry policy, more intense price
competition always reduces the incumbent's profits. With a build-out
rule, however, the incumbent's profits will rise even if entry would
result in intense price competition. While this may seems a bit
paradoxical, this apparent anomaly is explained when one recognizes
that the prospects for intense price competition serves to retard and
deter entry. Stated another way, both the build-out rule and intense
price competition work together to significantly retard entry. With
entry sufficiently deterred, the incumbent will never have to reduce
its price significantly.40
Like Tables 2 and 3, the simulation results summarized in
Table 4 show that the interests of consumers and incumbents are
always in conflict. The fact that both policymakers and incumbents
are strong advocates of build-out rules is puzzling, particularly if
policymakers are viewed as serving the interests of consumers.
39. GAO Report, supra note 38, at 15.
40. Cable operators have already signaled to telecom entrants that competition will
be intense. See, e.g., Comcast to Boost Residential Internet Service Speed, WALL ST. J.,
July 12, 2005, at D4 (reporting that Comcast, the nation's largest cable operator, will
automatically begin to upgrade existing subscribers located in Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Detroit, New Jersey and Washington, D.C. to six megabits per second for free (or eight
megabits per second for an additional $10) during Summer 2005). Coincidentally, these
are the same states where Verizon plans to roll-out its FiOS fiber-to-the-home product.
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IV. Impact of Build-Out Rules with Defection
Our benchmark simulation above shows that a universal build-
out rule has the effect of the entrant bypassing entire communities
(77% of the communities in particular). In the current U.S. cable
franchise system, build-out requirements are not uniform and many
communities have no such requirements. But, for the results
summarized in Tables 2 through 4, we have assumed that all markets
either have a build-out rule or do not. In reality, some markets will
impose the build-out requirement while others will allow for free
entry. We can consider the effects of a mix of entry constraints by
allowing free entry in some markets while imposing a build-out rule
in others.
Communities benefit from defecting from a build-out
requirement by increasing their relative attractiveness to entrants. If
we assume that the entrant has limited deployment resources, then
the entrant will direct its limited resources to their highest-value use.4
As a result, a community can "leap-frog" other communities and
make its locality more profitable to the entrant by not imposing a
build-out requirements. We can evaluate how a community may be
affected by defection using the simulation.
If we assume, for example, that 25% of the markets do not
impose a build-out rule (and the other 75% impose such a
requirement), then the average increase in the rank of the "defectors"
is 38 places. In other words, a market ranked 50th in terms of
profitability with a build-out rule ranks 12th in profitability, on
average, if it does not impose a build-out rule. Given that it is the
high cost markets that are abandoned by the entrant under a build-
out rule, it is these markets that may have the most to gain from this
"defection."
So, in the presence of widespread application of a build-out
rule, policymakers (local and state) can increase the probability of
their markets being served sooner rather than later by rejecting the
requirement for an entrant to serve the entire market.
V. Conclusion
Policymakers have long wished for the nation's two wireline
communications goliaths-the cable and local telephone industries-
to compete aggressively for residential consumers over a bundle of
41. Note that we are not assuming a capital budget constraint, only that deployment
resources such as labor and materials are limited and directed to higher valued uses first.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [28:207
voice, video, and data services. The desired outcomes are lower
prices that result from head-to-head competition and expanded
consumer choice among providers and video line-ups.
That dream is on the brink of becoming a reality.
Technological advances and new infrastructure deployment have put
the country at the cusp of this inter-modal competition for advanced
products and services. Cable companies today are now deploying
advanced, Voice over Internet Protocol service that is substantially
deregulated and not subject to any build-out commitment. At the
same time, telephone companies like Verizon and SBC are
aggressively deploying new fiber services, but their ability to sell
multichannel video services to residential consumers must pass
through a long and torturous local franchise process. There should be
no surprise, then, that while cable companies serve over 3.7 million
residential consumers with telephone service, 42 incumbent telephone
companies only serve a smattering of video customers.43
One aspect of the cable local franchising process is the
imposition of "build-out" requirements on new video entrants.
Authorities that impose such build-out rules perhaps have the best of
intentions, which is to assure that all constituents in their community
receive the benefits of competition. But we show in this paper that
this is a risky gamble-i.e., a build-out rule, in fact, creates a
tremendous disincentive for a new entrant to invest and is likely to
result in entire communities being bypassed. Our theoretical model
shows that a build-out rule will always increase costs and reduce
profits of the prospective entrant, and our empirical simulations show
that the net result is substantially less deployment. In other words, a
build-out rule designed to prevent "economic red-lining" within a
community essentially imposes a different form of "economic red-
lining" between communities. Further, if entry is deterred by the
build-out rule, consumers are denied a price break that they would
have otherwise received in the absence of the rule.
42. Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC,
Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 2004 (July 2005) at Table 5.
43. In the Eleventh Cable Competition Report, the FCC reported that the majority of
cable operators offered some form of voice telephone service-in that same report, the
FCC observed that telephone company video entry "remains limited." Eleventh Annual
Cable Competition Report, supra note 31, at 125.
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APPENDIX
A SIMULATION OF SEQUENTIAL ENTRY
In this Appendix, we describe the details of the simulation of
sequential entry. The simulation is programmed and run using the
statistical software package Eviews 5.1 (www.eviews.com). A
spreadsheet could be used, but the simulation would be exceedingly
slow and clumsy given the large number of calculations and random
numbers generated for the simulation.
There are four fundamental components of the simulation: (a)
demand; (b) costs; (c) entry decision; and (d) defection. We describe
each in turn, though the first three are jointly determined to some
extent.
Demand:
The demand curve in all markets is identical. In each market, we
have uniformly distributed reservation prices between $4800 and $0.
Since marginal costs are zero, the monopoly price is $2400, where the
own-price demand elasticity is -1.0 and market penetration (homes
buying divided by homes passed) is 50%. The demand curve is
p = 4800 -4800q (B-1)
where p is price and q is the penetration rate (0 < q < 1). The demand
curve is calibrated so that the average sale price of cable system
would be, on average, approximately $1200 per home-passed, which is
consistent with industry statistics.44
Prices are uniform across the market and across the incumbent
and entrant. Market price falls as the entrant passes more homes (i.e.,
overlap), and q rises as p falls as indicated by the demand curve. We
assume a benchmark price reduction from monopoly to 100% overlap
of 20%.4'
Consumer surplus in each market is calculated as (4800 -
p*)q*/2, where (p*, q*) are the relevant equilibrium quantities.
Monopoly profits in each market are simply 2400.0.5-1000 = 1.2M, or
$120M across all 100 simulated markets.
44. Eleventh Annual Cable Competition Report, supra note 31, at Table 5.
45. GAO Report, supra note 38.
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Costs:
Entry costs are computed for each home in each market using the
function
ki, m = Aexp(1 + ri,,m• s) (B-2)
where k, is the capital entry costs for home i in market m, A is
constant, r is a standard normal random variable unique for each
home, and s is scale parameter unique to each market. The constant
A is set so that the average cost per home passed across all markets is
$600, which is consistent with industry statistics. Equation (B-2)
renders variation both within and across markets, with r determining
within market variation and s determining across market variation.
The scale parameter s is set such that 0.5 < s < 1.5, where this
range was based on an evaluation of the distribution of loop costs
across census block groups using the HAI 5.0 TELRIC cost model.
The range for s was determined by estimating the following
regression for a number of states:
lnL = P0 + fPR + 6 (B-3)
where L is ordered loop costs and R is an ordered standard normal
random variable. The estimated coefficient P, is an estimate of s, and
we found that the estimated parameter typically fell between 0.50 and
1.5.
We can interpret the term [1 + exp(r-s)] as market density, where
costs are a direct function of density. Research shows that population
density is approximately lognormal, which explains our choice of
functional form.
Entry:
A home is passed if
E(rg ) > ki (B-4)
where E(rg) is the expected revenue per home passed if g are homes
passed and ki is the entry costs of home i. Expected revenues for the
entrant are simply the market price multiplied by the product of the
entrant's market share and the aggregate market penetration. With a
build-out requirement, the entrant serves the entire market if the
entrant's revenue at 100% overlap exceeds the sum of k for the
market. Investment is simply the sum of per-home capital costs for
whatever number of homes the entrant chooses to serve or is forced
to serve under the build-out requirement.
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Defection:
The change in profit rank from defection is easily computed. First,
we assign a rank to the build-out profit for each market. We then
select f markets for defection, and replace the build-out profit for
each of the f markets with their respective free entry profits. We then
re-rank the profits and compute the mean change in rank.
